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THE LONE WOLF TERRORIST: MECHANISMS AND TRIGGERS
OF A PROCESS-DRIVEN RADICALIZATION
Cody Pajunen

Introduction
In early 2015, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) launched a social
media campaign calling for the enlistment of “lone wolf ” terrorists to carry
out attacks throughout Great Britain.1 Providing an assortment of attack rec
ommendations and suggestions online, ISIL sought to galvanize individuals
to carry out devastating violence on its behalf. The ISIL “call to duty” is not
directed at specific individuals, yet British anti-radicalization expert Haras
Rafiq claims these virtual threats must “be taken with the utmost seriousness.”2
Rafiq’s instruction should not be overlooked. Lone wolves represent a small, yet
potent threat to national and international security. Although normally carried
out by single individuals, the amount of lone wolf terrorist attacks between the
1970s to the present have increased by forty-five percent in the U.S. and by
1
E x p r e s s M a g a z i n e , “ I S C a l l s f o r ‘ L o n e Wo l f ’ Te r r o r A t t a c k s i n
UK,” Express, Januar y 25, 2015, http://www.express.co.uk /ne ws/uk/55410/
Islamic-State-calls-for-lone-wolf-terror-attacks-in-UK-gives-tips-on-planning-rampages.
2
Ibid.
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four-hundred and twelve percent throughout Europe.3 Lone wolves represent
a threat to security because of their unpredictability. They attack in sporadic
intervals for a variety of causes and come from a diverse array of backgrounds.
No single profile of a lone wolf can be constructed and, as a result, they are
extremely difficult to detect and neutralize before they violently act out. Because
one common profile of lone wolves can be difficult to construct, it may seem as
though they will be impossible to identify. However, a commonality between
all lone wolves exists: radicalization. According to the UK government, radi
calization is “the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and
forms of extremism leading to terrorism.”4 If this process can be identified by
authorities, lone wolves and their impending attacks could be undermined in
the future. This begs the question: how does an individual become radicalized
to the point of carrying out a terrorist attack as a lone wolf?
To answer this question, what a lone wolf terrorist is must first be established.
For starters, lone wolves are terrorists. According to the Central Intelligence
Agency, a terrorist is an individual who executes premeditated violence against
noncombatant targets for political purposes.5 Terrorist actions are subsequently
carried out to redistribute political resources in a society.6 Lone wolves are
individuals who execute violent actions for political purposes, however, they
represent a distinct variation of terrorism. Lone wolf expert, Dr. Ramon Spaaij,
differentiates lone wolf terrorists from other types of terrorists by looking at
three key factors: operating individually, not belonging to a formal terrorist
group or organization, and having a modus operandi that is not subject to
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external influence.7 This does not mean lone wolf terrorists (LWTs) are not
under the ideological influence of a specific movement or organization but
rather that their actions are self-initiated, self-directed, and self-sustaining.
However, what specifically drives an individual to autonomously carry out an
act of terror has remained elusive even to experts. In an attempt to highlight
the transition from civilian to lone wolf terrorist, forensic psychology experts
J. Reid Meloy and Jessica Yakeley believe it necessary to look at one issue in
particular: how the lone wolf terrorist morally sanctions his or her actions.8
This process of an individual morally sanctioning terrorist actions is known as
radicalization. Radicalization is a dynamic, fluid path that prompts individuals
to commit violence on behalf of a certain political goal. Political forces should
subsequently be the focus of radicalization. A comprehensive blueprint of the
radicalization process lone wolf terrorists undergo from a political perspective
has yet to be established. This research seeks to illuminate the radicalization that
lone wolf terrorists undergo occurs in a step-wise process. This process starts
with the isolation experienced by lone wolves. Identification with a certain
cause or social movement by the lone wolf is subsequently covered. Finally, the
way in which lone wolf terrorist attacks are physically externalized is addressed.
Isolation
Mechanisms
Political forces are the most substantial drivers of lone wolf radicalization.
However, it should be noted that psychological mechanisms have set the stage
in aiding an individual autonomously sanctioning politically motivated violence.
Many lone wolves, although not all, have suffered from the limited development
of the prefrontal cortex region of the brain. As a result, they may display traits of
impulsivity, grandiosity, and vulnerability that are all indicative of psychological
immaturity.9 The combination of these factors relating to an underdeveloped
prefrontal cortex in an individual forges isolated tendencies. Psychological im
maturity and vulnerability makes the threat of social rejection unbearable. As a
7
Ramon Spaaij, “The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment,” Studies in Conflict
and Terrorism 33 (2010): 856.
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Perspectives on Terrorism,” Behavioral Sciences and the Law 32 (2014): 358.
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result, physical isolation can be partially derived from pre-existing psychological
forces. However, these psychological forces are not a sufficient means of ex
plaining the isolation of lone wolf radicalization. According to a United States
Naval Postgraduate statistical analysis of fifty-three American LWTs, there is
no significant correlation between psychological disorders and the formation
of a LWT.10 Lone wolves are supposedly autonomous actors, but how can
this be if other factors aside from their own psyches are necessary in catalyzing
their violent actions? The answer lies in the fact that acting autonomously is
not necessarily the same as thinking autonomously.
Triggers
LWTs are differentiated from their organization-Affiliated terrorist counterparts
because they act autonomously. Terrorists obtain the label “lone wolf ” based
off their actions, not their beliefs. Lone wolves acquire their label by acting
autonomously not necessarily by thinking autonomously. Coming under the
ideological influence of a terrorist organization does not necessarily nullify the
LWT label because beliefs can be separated from actions. Radical influences
such as terrorist dogma can prove extremely influential among isolated indi
viduals. For example, United States Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan believed
that Muslims were being exploited as a result of the US’s wars in the Middle
East—a belief held by many radical jihadi groups to which Hasan was exposed.
His perspectives on Islam and the plight of modern Muslims were formed in
isolation via external jihadi influence. However, he independently executed
the Fort Hood massacre from resource and tactical standpoints. By acting in
an autonomous manner, Hasan fills all the criteria of a LWT even though his
beliefs were influenced by a broader social movement. Hasan’s isolation al
lowed his belief system to be heavily swayed by external tides of jihadi beliefs.
It was these beliefs, constructed in isolation that prompted Hasan to execute
the massacre at Fort Hood. Therefore, the effect of beliefs in isolation can be
seen as a crucial precursor to action.
External radicalizing agents, such as beliefs, solidify physical and spiritual
isolation within lone wolves. Preexisting psychological tendencies have set
up isolationist tendencies within vulnerable individuals; however, it is the
10
Charles A. Eby, “The Nation that Cried Lone Wolf: A Data-Driven Analysis of
Individual Terrorists in the United States Since 9/11,” Naval Postgraduate School, March 2012,
p. 61, http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/6789/12Mar_Eby.pdf?sequence=1.
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influences that stress politicized beliefs that trigger sustained isolation. These
politicized beliefs can take many forms but nonetheless stress the necessity of
a redistribution of power throughout the world. General Hasan fell prey to the
belief system of jihadi ‘crusaders’ who stress the plight of Muslims throughout
the world. He withdrew himself to such an extent that the Fort Hood mas
sacre came as a complete shock to all affected. The overarching political forces
of existing jihadi dogma surrounding Hasan triggered genuine isolation that
helped drive his eventual attack. Isolation, however, is only a stepping-stone on
the path of radicalization on which lone wolves embark. External politicizing
agents help trigger sustained isolation within lone wolves and continue to drive
radicalization. The accumulation of external radicalizing agents aligns potential
lone wolves with a certain identity—an identity that forms another necessary
facet of the radicalization process.
Identification
Identification Mechanisms
Two mechanisms act as structural elements that set the stage for potential
LWTs to embark on the process of identification. The first mechanism is that
of the social movement. Social Movement Theory describes the effects of social
movements and gives great insight into the diffusion of external influences
that play a part in shaping and projecting individuals’ ideas. It asserts that
social movements consist of a “set of opinions and beliefs in a population
which represents preferences for changing the social structure and/or reward
distribution of a society.”11 The primary goal of a social movement is to garner
the sympathy of a population so that the movement’s cause can gain societal
traction. To acquire this sympathy, a social movement may have a relatively
broad platform of beliefs so that it may appeal to a wide range of individuals.
Organizations direct operations amongst a population to diffuse the idea that
social movements provide. These are known as social movement organizations
(SMOs). Al-Qaeda is an example of an organization advancing the spread of
the broader jihadist social movement.
Social movements produce belief systems attractive to those looking to
manifest intrinsic political frustrations. Lone wolves latch on to these diffused
11
John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zaid, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements:
A Partial Theory,” The American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (1977): 1217-1218.
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belief systems. Being isolated, lone wolves often fuse these external belief systems
with their own. These belief systems are violent in nature. Al-Qaeda’s adherence
to its interpretation of jihadism, for example, blends individual beliefs with
militant and homicidal undertones. The belief systems of lone wolves adhering
to Al-Qaeda-inspired dogma are infiltrated and manipulated by violent beliefs
and values. Social movements thus serve as mechanisms that help structure the
identity of lone wolves. Lone wolves take up a cause that a social movement
advocates for, come under the influence of the movement’s belief system, and
subsequently identify with its goals and vision.
SMO operations revolve around maintaining group survival and ensuring
a favorable cost/reward relationship for individuals that participate in their
activities.12 In short, organizations need dedicated followers to advance their
goals. To acquire followers, organizations need to deploy resources in order to
make their cause attractive. Resources represent the second identification mecha
nism. Moral, cultural, human, material, and socio-organizational resources all
aid in advancing the efforts of an SMO.13 Moral resources appeal to value
systems of populations. Cultural resources provide organizations with “strate
gic know-how” that enables efforts to sustain recruitment amongst a specific
population.14 Human resources solidify an organization’s expertise, labor size,
and leadership to give it credibility in numbers, charisma, and work capacity.
Material resources include tangible assets such as monetary funds, property, and
supplies that an organization has at its disposal. Socio-organizational assets
constitute an organization’s infrastructure, social network, and organizational
capacities. These different types of resources function as a mechanism of the
identification process of LWT radicalization by structuring the societal image
of social movements and organizations. They ultimately lay the foundation for
the diffusion of an SM’s or SMO’s goals. Such diffusion creates the appeal of
movements and organizations to make its message more conducive to attract
ing potential LWTs.
The extent to which these resources can be acquired and deployed thus
12
John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zaid, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements:
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dictates the success of an SMO. Al-Qaeda is an organization emblematic of
effectively distributed resources. It has been supported by international “celebri
ties” such as Osama bin Laden and enjoys sympathy from national governments
such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen, giving it ample moral resources. Culturally,
Al-Qaeda targets potential LWTs by using social media to facilitate the inter
national popularity of its Inspire Magazine, which diffuses its message and
ideology across the globe. Al-Qaeda’s human assets include experts trained in
the art of terror tactics, the maintenance of terror financing networks, and war
fare. Al-Qaeda’s material resources entail the acquisition of safe-haven property
and transnational funding. From a socio-organizational resource standpoint,
Al-Qaeda offers potential recruits access to digital support networks so that
physical contact doesn’t have to ever be made for belief alignment to be diffused.
By combining all these variations of resources, Al-Qaeda has had the op
portunity to diffuse its ideological base to lone wolves. The organization projects
its message as a product made available for potential consumers and potential
lone wolves to access. The act of employing multiple resources simultaneously
to make a certain message or product appealing to isolated individuals is known
as “slick packaging” in Social Movement Theory. Slick packaging is deployed
to increase the overall appeal of a certain social movement product. The more
appealing the message, the more likely an isolated individual will enter the
process of lone wolf radicalization.15 The resources deployed by social move
ment organizations thus operate as a mechanism for lone wolf identification
by providing an appealing message with which to align.
Identification Triggers
The mechanisms that may lead isolated individuals down the path of radical
ization do not themselves forge a lone wolf to identify with a greater cause.
Millions of individuals worldwide are exposed to radical movements daily, yet
a seemingly negligible percentage of this vast population turn out to become
lone wolves. This is because only an intrinsic trigger can forge a lone wolf. This
trigger comes in the form of a personal grievance. Most of society becomes
exposed to social movement ideologies yet few harbor a grievance that produces
the propensity for violent action. In the case of lone wolves, a grievance consists

15
John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zaid, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements:
A Partial Theory,” The American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 6 (1977): 1231.
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of an inner animosity aimed at an external source.
The fact that lone wolves exhibit grievances is not surprising given their
tendencies to be narcissistic and isolated. Being narcissistic, lone wolves often
times perceive events only in the context of how they are affected and blame
external sources for misfortune that has befallen them. This grievance can be
derived from a variety of sources but nonetheless is individually constructed.
Social movement entities, such as Al-Qaeda, prey on existing grievances that
many have such as the disenfranchisement of Muslims in poor European com
munities. The message Al-Qaeda sends of justice via violence becomes appealing
to many who inhabit grievances regarding the plight of Muslims in these
areas. Once external messages meet internal animosities, the process of lone
wolf identification culminates. Lone wolf grievances find seemingly credible
outlets such as social movement organizations to manifest their frustrations
and remain loyal to them as result.
Grievances, although necessary, are not a sufficient trigger to solidifying
lone wolf identification. Grievances help lone wolves align their inner beliefs
with external sources. They run individual beliefs parallel to that of a certain
movement or group but have not been able to completely converge the two
belief systems. In order for a potential lone wolf to completely identify with
a specific movement or group, an individual must undergo vicarious cogni
tive dissonance. Vicarious cognitive dissonance occurs when an individual’s
belief system is altered after a person of an in-group is observed committing a
hypocritical act.16 This hypocritical act creates dissonance in the observer. The
observer wants to fully identify with a group or individual but has a difficult
time in doing so as a result of the hypocritical act that was witnessed, creating
dissonance between the observer’s preexisting morals and the urge to identify
with an external source. To quell this dissonance, the attitudes towards the
hypocritical act are altered to support it.
By morally sanctioning the wrongful act of an outside source, attitude
changes become solidified as both belief systems converge. In this case, the
structured message of an external force solidifies identification by providing a
product with such high appeal that individual, internal psychological impulses
16
Scott Atran and Marc Sageman, “Theoretical Frame on Pathways to Violent
Radicalization: Understanding the Ideas and Behaviors, How They Interact and How They Describe
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force the convergence of belief systems between the mechanism and individual.
This convergence is catalyzed by the trigger of psychologically vulnerable indi
viduals to dedicate themselves to an entity bigger than themselves at the cost
of their natural moral compass. Identification is completed when this forced
convergence in belief systems is solidified. After the completion of identifica
tion, the final necessary means in the radicalization process of potential LWTs
is initiated: externalization.
Externalization
At this point in the radicalization process, potential LWTs are isolated and
have subsequently identified with an overarching movement. As complex as
these first two steps may be, a lone wolf terrorist has not yet been formed.
Rather, a socially marginalized “ideologue” has been produced. In order to be
considered a terrorist, one must perform a terrorist act. To be considered an
act, a potential LWT must physically externalize his or her inner frustration.
A new combination of mechanisms must come into contact with a different
set of triggers in order for externalization to occur.
Mechanisms of Externalization
Similarly to isolation and identification, externalization manifests via structural
elements. These three elements include the formation of a perceived injustice,
development of a negative identification, and a lack of legitimate political outlets
available to externalize frustrations. These mechanisms interact with one another
to direct a potential LWT’s inner animosity outward. Once in place, these ele
ments lay fertile ground for certain triggers that ultimately result in a terrorist
act. The three mechanisms of lone wolf externalization follow a pattern. First,
the root of a certain problem is identified by the lone wolf. Next, the perceived
reason as to why a problem needs to be addressed is solidified. Finally, the lone
wolf creates a blueprint as to exactly how a problem is going to be addressed.
During the identification process, lone wolves form a favorable opinion of a
certain movement’s values, beliefs, and actions. These favorable opinions form
what is known as positive identification. This positive identification, depend
ing on the movement with which the potential LWT is identifying, can have
negative effects. Identifying with a certain movement or group means that those
opposed to it may be viewed in a negative light. Since social movements are
formed in order to change the status quo of a certain issue, antagonistic forces,
such as those trying to maintain the status quo or change it, may be seen as
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the enemy. Usually, this is not an issue because social movements and their
entailing organizations are not militant toward one another. In the context of
transnational terrorist or criminal entities, however, militancy is the lingua franca.
Groups or individuals impeding the progress of a certain militant movement
are seen as enemy forces that need to be completely undermined or destroyed.
In the case of lone wolves, the process of vilifying an asserted antagonistic entity
results in negative identification towards those opposed to the interest of the
lone wolf ’s Affiliations.
Negative identification has grave consequences when contextualized in lone
wolves. If an influential social movement or organization designates a group
as its enemy, members become fixated on destroying it. Isolation has strong
additive effects on a lone wolf ’s dedication to acting on negative identifica
tion. The extent to which a problem is occurring in society can be drastically
miscalculated among isolated actors, especially when psychologically vulnerable
to narrow-minded assertions and the appeal of grandiose actions. This fixation
ultimately turns a certain entity, whether it is a person, group, government, or
label, into an enemy. Since both parties are opposed to one another in terms
of competing for similar resources of a shared issue, the enemy’s gain is seen as
the potential LWT’s loss. Thus, the enemy becomes a target so that it cannot
decrease the LWT’s operations. This targeting acts as a structure for externaliza
tion because it provides the potential LWT with a direction in which actions
can be aimed if need be.
Negative identification provides the “what” of externalization. At this point
a potential LWT may have a good idea as to “what” should be targeted if neces
sary. The second externalization mechanism, a perceived injustice, provides the
potential LWT with the “why”. A perceived injustice is exactly as it seems: an
action by another, seemingly adversarial, entity that is seen as a direct attack
on the potential LWT and his or her associated group or goal. This injustice is
“perceived” because it may or may not have been a direct attack on the LWT.
The action was construed by either the potential LWT or his or her identified
group as an attack. Such an “attack” justifies the reasons for hating a certain
enemy in the first place. The perceived injustice thus structures the potential
LWT’s opinions by making them believe something must be done to counter
it so that similar actions do not reoccur.
A third structural mechanism for externalization is the lack of legitimate
political outlets through which frustrations can be expressed. If a potential
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LWT is exhibiting frustrations but is willing to use a legitimate outlet to induce
change, the externalization of a terrorist act could be nullified. However, the
positive use of political processes do not always pan out. Even if legitimate
political outlets do exist, isolated individuals may be so delusional about a
certain problem that they deem any form of accepted political activism as
inherently corrupt and unable to yield preferred results. Whatever the cause, a
lack of actual or perceived political outlets give the potential LWT the “how”
to externalize his or her action. If legal means of externalizing a frustration
are not available, a different route must be chosen. A lack of effective political
mechanisms thus structures the externalization of a potential LWT action by
convincing the individual that the way in which frustrations can be vented must
include something outside the parameters of legality. In the case of militant
movements, violence is usually considered a more than viable action. The “what,”
“why,” and “how” of externalization integrate at this point and cumulatively
provide the basis for lone wolf terrorist action to be physically manifested.
Triggers of Externalization
Three triggers accompany each of the aforementioned structural mechanisms
of externalization. These triggers are a development of strong reciprocity, moral
obligation, and the formulation of alternative strategies to vent frustrations.
An important point to note is that these triggers are largely derivatives of an
individual’s psyche. Only the lone wolf can decide to act on the structural
mechanisms. This point illustrates the very nature of LWTs and their ulti
mate autonomy in formulating decisions. These triggers, like their respective
mechanistic counterparts, follow a process that results in lone wolf terrorism.
The first trigger in this process is strong reciprocity. Strong reciprocity
occurs when an individual is willing to make a sacrifice for a thing or idea by
which he or she is not directly affected.17 The development of this psycho
logical inclination is actually derived from altruism. Individuals who exhibit
strong reciprocity want to put forth their resources to sustain an overall cause
or idea they deem worthy. However, in any social environment, there will
always be those who free-ride off of altruistic behavior (defectors). Those who
defect from cooperating with a cause or movement are considered an enemy
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by individuals who behave altruistically because they (the defectors) impede
upon the advancement of a certain movement, idea, or goal for which others are
working toward. Strong reciprocity induces individuals to remedy the problem
of defectors by either coercing them into cooperation or exterminating them.
The defectors represent the entity which the lone wolf negatively identifies with
and subsequently plan to attack. Strong reciprocity thus triggers lone wolf at
tacks by providing justification for attacking a specific target.
A second externalization trigger presents itself in the form of moral ob
ligation. A moral obligation produces the trigger as to why a lone wolf must
externalize an inner frustration in the form of a terrorist act. At this point, a
social movement or organization has already provided a message clarifying the
reasons as to why a certain entity must be perceived as the enemy. Lone wolves
subsequently develop an intrinsic justification of attacking the target laid out
by the social movement or organization. Once the moral obligation of a lone
wolf to carry out an attack on specific target converges with the message of an
outside radicalizing agent, the externalization process is further solidified.
The final trigger leading to a lone wolf attack is a plan of execution. Here,
the lone wolf has solidified his or her moral obligation to exhibiting strong
reciprocity against a specific target. What has not yet been determined is exactly
how such a moral obligation will be acted on. In order for the lone wolf to
carry out his or her perceived moral obligation, a plan outside the legal realms
of political representation must be devised. Although acting autonomously, it
is important to remember that lone wolves act under the influence of a certain,
often violence-prone, group or movement. The alternative strategy a lone wolf
devises is thus frequently a violent act. This strategy integrates the power of
the two previously mentioned triggers and guides them to a self-directed plan
of action. When an alternative, violent outlet to vent a political frustration is
acted upon, a terrorist act is executed and a lone wolf terrorist is formed.
Conclusion
The process of an individual transforming into a lone wolf terrorist contains an
immeasurable amount of interacting factors. These factors differ from individual
to individual as psyches and experiences are never the same between any two
people. However, a commonality among all lone wolves is that each under
went a process consisting of isolation, identification, and externalization. This
process, no matter the amount of variables involved, forged an individual that
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autonomously committed an act of terror. These acts of terror, without a doubt,
have and will continue to differ according to place, time, extent of destruction,
and justification. The point of this paper is not to give an exact formula for the
type of person that will become a lone wolf terrorist but to provide a procedural
framework in regards to the political forces that interact in the process of lone
wolf radicalization. The effects of both structural mechanisms and intrinsically
driven triggers show that more factors than just the individual are at play in
the formation of lone wolf terrorists. Rather, learned behaviors combine an
individual’s environment and psychological impulses to produce actions. This
complex combination forges the radicalization process of the lone wolf terrorist.
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